Introduction
In his book entitled Practical Ethics, Peter Singer argues that we have an obligation to assist, to give foreign aid. This conflict between aid and sovereignty is not surprising.
The positive and negative duties implied by giving aid require placing conditions on aid and conditionality, unless it is spurious, will conflict in some way with sovereignty. Yet, state sovereignty cannot simply be ignored, as sometimes seems to be the practice. If the government has any legitimacy in representing the "will of the people," the right to selfdetermination translates into the right to state sovereignty and must be respected. In addition, state sovereignty itself is an important component of self-sustaining development, our ultimate goal as aid providers.
The rest of this essay fills out these arguments. I first refine the obligation to give aid and the duties implied therein.
In the following section, I contrast the political and the philosophical views of state sovereignty and, casting political 4 sovereignty as a right, explore the implications of the latter.
I next argue that the conflict between official aid and sovereignty is central and unavoidable. The final section provides some guidance for making the necessary compromise between conditionality and sovereignty and closes with a sketch of the implications for aid in practice.
II. Duties of Aid Donors
The arguments I present here accept the claim that we have an obligation to give aid to distant peoples. Using this as a starting point, the focus shifts from aid as a cost to the donor to aid as a benefit to the recipient. In this light, we can reinterpret aid in a more abstract and meaningful fashion: aid is relief and development assistance. The relevant quantity is not the amount of aid given but the amount of relief and development assistance received. Relief prevents starvation and health-threatening malnutrition. Development assistance promotes a self-sustaining increase in the quality of life particularly for the poorest in society. 4 With this conception of aid, we cannot look simply at resource transfer. Rather, we must look at the use of these resources, at the long term effects of these uses and the resource transfer itself, and at distributional issues. Should the World Bank or US AID have counted aid to the Philippines 5 during the Marcos era as the number of billions of dollars transferred to government accounts? Surely not, when all involved knew that much of the money quickly found its way into private hands.
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The long term effects have been negative as repayment of Marcos era loans from the World Bank continues to this day. This so-called aid has also worsened the distribution of income as most of the benefits were gathered by the wealthiest while current structural adjustment policies necessary to continue debt servicing push the unskilled unemployment rate toward 50 percent. As this example points out, the obligation to give aid must go beyond a blind transfer of resources.
As aid donors, we have certain duties. These duties insure that the aid given, the resource transfer, is received as disaster relief and development assistance. These duties are positive and negative: the positive duty to maximize the good done and the negative duty to avoid significant harm to a significant number of people. If aid does not adhere to these guidelines, it is meaningless to call it aid. 6 The positive duty to insure that aid given is used efficiently in relief and development work is a primary force behind the practice of administering aid as development projects rather than channeling aid funds directly into the general budget of the recipient government. A development project has relatively specific goals and is defined sectorally, 6 geographically or both. It is implemented over a fairly short period of time, typically three to eight years. The donor knows the use of its aid and can calculate in a rough way the contribution made to economic development. This, it is hoped, will enable the donor to be sure its resources are used well.
Indeed, the charters of some international development organizations, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, require these institutions to insure that their funds are used efficiently for promoting development. Such clauses traditionally have been interpreted as requiring project aid.
It is well known that the project level cost-benefit analysis alluded to above can be misleading. Donors face a fungibility problem since aid funds for a project the government already intended to carry-out effectively finance other activities which may be in direct conflict with donor goals. 7 The positive duty of the aid donor is not easily met. Not only must the donor examine the merits of the project funded, it must also speculate about the intentions of the recipient government. In the case where the donor is not generally in agreement with the policies of the recipient government, the donor must put relatively strict conditions on the use of aid, even targeting projects not highly favored by the recipient government, if it wishes to minimize the fungibility problem.
Matching this positive duty is a negative duty to avoid 
III. The Right to Political Sovereignty
Why should we respect the political sovereignty of aid recipients when it may interfere with the efficient allocation of What is entailed in respecting the right to sovereignty of a legitimate state? It is not only the territorial domain of the sovereign state that should be held sacrosanct but also the domestic policies (and foreign policies to the extent that they do not come into conflict with those of another state). Indeed, the arguments presented above focus on this latter aspect of sovereignty since the individual's right to self-determination is most directly linked to the formulation of domestic policy. The concept of aid without strings implies both that aid would be distributed randomly and that aid would continue to be allocated regardless of the behavior of the recipient states. This is useful since the sooner the preposterous requirements of stringless aid are understood, the sooner one can get on with examining the important problems of the number and kind of strings on aid that are desirable from various points of view.
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V. Resolving the Conflicts
Recognizing the nature and importance of this conflict between aid and sovereignty can take us a long way toward resolving it. In the following discussion, I outline such a resolution making frequent use of the domestic analogy. By the domestic analogy I mean that I assume interpersonal ethics can be extended to the international arena but allow for modification when that analogy falls short.
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I argue that project aid can be made explicitly conditional on how the resources are used and distributed. I also argue for implicit conditionality on program aid but claim that explicit policy conditions pose too great a threat to sovereignty.
As a domestic analogy, consider encountering a needy woman with children living on the street. We have an obligation to assist this woman if the cost to us of doing so is not too high.
We Continuing with the analogy, suppose we encounter the same woman one year later with yet another child and still on the street. Bracketing concerns about the children's welfare, we may think twice about repeating our generous act. Our assistance has had little impact on the woman and we can guess that repeating it is unlikely to lead to permanent improvements. We would be within our rights to withhold assistance to her this time, perhaps directing our aid to another equally needy person. Yet, a clear part of the problem is the woman's inability to limit her fertility. Perhaps the most efficient thing would be to convince her to address this issue. We might offer free lodging on the condition that she get a NorPlant ™ or a tubal ligation. On further investigation, we find that the young woman dropped out of school at an early age. We could offer food and clothing on the condition that she go back to school. Although this sort of aid may be well intentioned, it is clearly coercive, infringing on the woman's bodily integrity and freedom of choice. This sort of explicit conditionality, while possibly very effective, is by most standards an unacceptable violation of self-determination since the needy person cannot reject the offer.
For the purposes this paper, I focus strictly on the woman. 
